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The recently-ratified Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP), also known as TPP11 (Trans-Pacific Partnership), is considered as one of the “new 
generation” trade agreements for some countries in the region, including Vietnam. CPTPP is 
anticipated to boost Vietnam’s trade in the third-largest free-trade area in the world by Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) as a new growth engine.  
The primary purposes of this dissertation are to identify the incentives behind the intra-bloc 
exporting activities and the trade potential of Vietnam. To accomplish these, a modified gravity 
model (followed Egger 2002) which involves a panel dataset covering trade between Vietnam 
and ten trading partners in the CPTPP region over the period 1995–2018. This paper also 
pictures a clear view of the Vietnamese economy, including the economic transition in the 
context of a more competitive business environment, the comparative advantages, and the 
analysis of how CPTPP could transform the domestic system of production.  
The regression results suggest that Vietnam’s export turnover is positively supported by the 
combined economic size, the similarity in country size, the difference in relative factor 
endowment, the bilateral real exchange rate, and the co-memberships in ASEAN or bilateral 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA), as well as is negatively impacted by the distance. However, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) co-membership is found to hurt the intra-bloc export 
revenue, which is consistent with findings from other researches. Moreover, the evidence also 
proposes that Vietnam does still have more room to boost the flows of its local products and 
services to other markets in the Trans-Pacific region.   
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Vietnam is becoming one of the most dynamic economies in the Asian region and has 
been calling recent appreciation as being the next promising “tiger”. After having 
experienced in industrialization and sustained transitions in economic systems since its 
economic reform in 1986, Vietnam successfully signed the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade 
Agreement (BTA) in 2001, making the new era for this country after centuries of trade 
embargoes. After that, Vietnam became an official member of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2007, entered into the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) in 2010, 
ratified the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP) in November 2018, and has officially signed the EU-Vietnam FTA (EVFTA) 
in June 2019. Those significant achievements in international integration are the results 
of discontinuous improvements of the economic regimes. In 2007, Goldman Sachs 
included Vietnam as one of the Next Eleven (or the N-11)1. Being considered in a range 
of measures (including energy, citification, infrastructure, health and technology, these 
eleven countries have been presenting impressive economic growth rates and are under 
the high expectation to become the vital driver in the globally economic transformation 
in future. In late 2009, the Global Forecasting Team of the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) listed Vietnam as a part of CIVETS, which are six promising emerging markets in 
future years - Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa – with the 
advantages of young population, relative political stability, and increase in foreign direct 
investments (FDIs). 
The US - China trade tension has begun on March 1st, 2018 and was pointed on the 
customs duty for the imported steel and aluminum. Superpower countries have been 
increasing the protectionist actions against each other day by day. Unfortunately, there 
are no stop signals of this commercial trade tension. As a reaction to these economic 
uncertainties, many FDI companies in both countries are surging the substitutes for the 
 
1 The N-11 includes Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey 
and Vietnam (https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-book/brics-chap-13.pdf) 
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current local manufacturing sites, which are directly influenced by trade barriers and 
restrictions at the moment. 
In this context, Vietnam is considered an ideal destination for some reasons, especially 
after participating in the “new generation” FTAs (CPTPP and EVFTA), which are the 
new growth engines after WTO’s accession. Its impressive economic growth rates, the 
geographical and cultural proximity to China, the relatively cheaper input costs as well 
as the FID-led and outward-orientated strategy of economic policies are also ones of the 
leading forces for some big companies to choose this country. 
This dissertation is divided into five main parts. The first is about the introduction and 
the general incentives for choosing Vietnam under the global business uncertainties. The 
second part is related to the industrialization and economic transition of the country. The 
third part mainly refers to the comparative advantages of Vietnam in the international 
business market. The fourth offers an in-depth analysis that figures out the impacts of 
CPTPP agreement on Vietnam’s economy and trades. Finally, it focuses on the study of 
the determinants of Vietnam’s bilateral exports and trade potentials in the Trans-Pacific 
region by involving the modified gravity model. 
2. The economic transition in Vietnam 
2.1 The economic revolution followed China’s reform 
After the Vietnam War in 1975, Vietnam was one of the lowermost countries in the world 
in terms of income. The country faced an economic crisis with below-$300 Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita, slow growth rate, and up-to-775% inflation in the 
1980s. Moreover, the combination of the after-war international isolation, the US’s trade 
embargo and the decline in Soviet aid made the slowdown of economic growth worse. 
Before becoming the third biggest rice exporter in the world at the present, Vietnam once 
struggled in feeding its people. 
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Vietnam borders China in the north. The proximity in geography has been tying Vietnam 
in a wide range of common things with China, including the language, history, culture, 
and economic development. Besides, Vietnam and China are two among the last 
communist states in the world. In 1986, “Đổi Mới” (in English: “Renovation”), a series 
of economic and political reforms, was initiated by the government to create “a socialist-
oriented market economy”. Doi Moi was considered to follow China’s economic reform 
in 1978 carefully that had already worked wonders. In which, Vietnam, similar to China, 
faced severely financial problems causing by the centralized planning systems and 
monopoly of power of the communist party for years, then decided to adopt some 
principles of the market economy to overcome poverty.  
Modeling China’s reforms, Doi Moi started in agricultural sectors, which play the most 
critical role in Vietnam’s economy. The government put an end to agricultural 
collectives, terminated the price management on agricultural stocks and products. In the 
following steps, the majority of the centralized economy was terminated. The 
government was decentralized, price controls were ended, and a market-driven 
mechanism took the place of inefficient government monopolies. Private entrepreneurs 
and foreign investments were encouraged to engage in the majority of economic activities 
and opened vital sectors, including agricultural ones. 
The economic transformation of Vietnam attained impressive accomplishments in the 
first 20 years of Doi Moi (1986-2006) with about 7.5% average GDP growth rate, which 
significantly soared from 2.79% in 1986 to 9.54% - the highest in 1995, as given in Figure 
1. The economy has maintained the annual growth rate in the range 5% - 7% until the 
present, making the average GDP growth rate achieved at 6.6% over 30 years of Doi Moi 
(Source: World Bank data). In 2018, Vietnam’s economic growth was at 7.08%, marking 
its highest rate in 11 years after overpassing the previous year 2017 of 6.8%. Vietnam is 
becoming one of the fastest-expanding economic systems all around the world and is 
achieving the second-strongest growth in the region, behind Cambodia (Figure 8, page 
15). Continuous improvements in economic sectors have lifted it from one of the poorest 
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countries up to the lower middle-income class. The government has created numerous 
jobs for million people, and the living standards has been increasing year by year. In 
1992, 52.9% of the population lived on less than $1.9 a day. In 2016, this figure was just 
2% (Source: World Bank data). Other comprehensive data are showing the improvement 
in GDP Per Capita, which significantly increased from $95 in 1989 to $2,564 in 2018, 
27 times after 30-years (Figure 2). 
 




Figure 2 - GDP per Capita - Vietnam (1989-2018)  
(Source: World Bank) 
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Looking ahead, the Asian Developing Bank (ADB) has projected Vietnam’s GDP to 
grow by 6.8% in 2019, and 6.7% in 2020 while controlling the expected inflation rates 
by 3.0% and 3.5% in the same years.2 In a long time until 2050, the global economic 
power will expectedly continue following the international megatrends, shifting away 
from the established advanced economies in North America, Western Europe to China, 
India, and other major emerging economies. In this context, Vietnam is forecasted to be 
one of the fast-enlarging and enormous economies over the period to 2050.  
2.2 Transition in the export structure 
By promoting the industrialization and modernization process in the whole nation as a 
significant motivator, export activities have been strategically planned to play as a key 
driver for Vietnamese economic development. Vietnam has regarded the orientation in 
encouraging trade and export, as well as the global economic integration as the priority 
when building the trade policy approach. The global and regional trade integration (which 
will be discussed further in Session 3.2.3 – Strong-built integration networks) has been 
fully utilized as a national strategic instrument to boost economic growth, as well as to 
ensure the national interest and security through increased economic power. 
Vietnam took the 22nd position for the number of exporting products and services all 
around the globe in 20183 and was the 83rd most sophisticated economy, as stated by the 
Economic Complexity Index 2013-20174. In 2018, Vietnam shipped an estimated $244 
billion worth of goods around the globe, gaining 60% compared to the year 2014 and 
roundly 15% higher value than that of 2017. Among exporting products, the following 
export products took account for the highest dollar value in Vietnam’s global shipment 
during 2018 (Table 1): 
  
 
2 The Asian Developing Bank – Vietnam Economy: https://www.adb.org/countries/viet-nam/economy 
3 Central Intelligence Agency 
4 The Economic Complexity Index measures the knowledge intensity of an economy by considering the knowledge 




Export value  
  ($ Bil.) 
% total 
 export 
1 Phones and accessories 49.2 20.2 % 
2 Textile, sewing products  30.5  12.5 % 
3 Electronic parts, computers and their parts  29.6  12.1 % 
4 Footwear 16.2 6.7 % 
5 Wood and wooden products 8.9 3.7 % 
6 Rucksacks, bag, pockets, wallets, hats 3.4 1.4 % 
7 Fishery products 8.8 3.6 % 
8 Fresh and processed vegetables & fruit 3.8 1.6 % 
9 Coffee 3.5 1.5 % 
10 Shelled cashew nut 3.4 1.4 % 
Table 1 - Top 10 exporting product categories of Vietnam in 2008 
(Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam) 
There is a significant shift among the top product contributors in Vietnamese’ export 
categories, which shows a gradual decrease in labor-intensive products (Figure 3). In 
more than ten years from 2000-2011, the main drivers for export growth of the country 
belonged to textile, sewing products, footwear, and agriculture goods, holding around 
25% of the total export revenues. Vietnam has even contributed a critical node in the 
global value chain of labor-intensive industries, including apparel and footwear. The year 
2012 recorded a significant change in exporting structure of Vietnam, marking a booming 
increase in the phones, computers, electronic parts, and related accessories’ export 
turnover. Since this year, these sectors increased 47% yearly on average for the period 
2012-2018, contributing to the 2-digit growth rate of the total export revenue in the same 
period. High-tech products, particularly mobile phones, have emerged as newly leading 
export categories. In 2017, Vietnam was in the third position in exporting phones and 
accessories, segmenting 11% of the global market and running up from sixth place in 
2016. This exporting shifting goes well with the direction of the socio-economic 
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development strategy, putting more weight on the manufacturing industries and 
innovation for sustainable economic development.  
 
Figure 3- Change in the top 3 of Vietnamese export, 2010-2018 
(Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam) 
 
The transformation in export pyramids has built a strong bedrock and incentive for the 
government to implement its intensive construction in labor force and infrastructure. 
Moreover, this change has incorporated related and supported organizations, including 
companies, administrative agencies, financial institution, vocational schools and 
universities. Those organizations do not only establish industrial clusters to appeal more 
investments from private and foreign investors but also intensify mutual network relations 
and interaction through competition and cooperation, which eventually create innovation.  
3. Vietnam’s comparative advantages for international trades 
Over more than 30 years since the Doi Moi reforms, Vietnam has become an attractive 
destination to foreign investors. 2011’s Per Capita Income of $1,260 marked the 
country’s economic transformation from the bottommost layer of income in the world to 
a lower-middle-income class after 25 years. Up to the minute, the Vietnamese economy 
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is sized at $224 billion approximately, equal to 70 per cent of the economic scale of 
Singapore ($324 billion). It is also placed at the sixth-largest position in the ASEAN, 
after Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. If Vietnam possibly 
prolongs the annual growth speed in the range of 6-6.5 percent in the subsequent decade, 
and Singapore continues to maintain a matured rate of about 2.5 percent annually in the 
same time, the scale of these two economies in real GDP will be expected to converge by 
2029.5 
 
Vietnam has been becoming a blueprint of economic development and 
internationalization of other emerging markets (Eckardt, Mishra, and Dinh, 2018). The 
global economy has been facing the standstill in growth rates, and the world is afraid of 
upcoming recessions as the results of the trade tensions, geopolitical conflicts, and other 
risks. In this context, Vietnam’s manufacturing sectors have progressively enlarged, 
adding an approximated 1.5 million new jobs in the period of 2014 - 2016 solely.6 As a 
result, Vietnam’s economy took the top ranking in GDP per Capita growth rate and 
second place in the GDP growth rate among the Southeast Asian countries in 2018 (Figure 
8, page 15). 
So, what is the reason behind the miracle of Vietnam’s achievements? The underlying 
causes are categorized into two groups: the basic foundations and the country’s building-
up comparative advantages. The former includes demographics and wages, and 
geographical location while the latter refers to the decisions made by the government, 
such as investments in human and infrastructures, a combination of domestic reforms and 
globalization, and trade policies with critical players in the global economy. Vietnam’s 
geographical position in the regional supply chain and its extensive network of FTA are 
crucially favorable assets among its pool of comparative advantages. 
 
5 DBS Group – Group Report, 2019, Economic & Strategy – Understanding Vietnam: The rising starrising star 





3.1 Basic foundations of Vietnam’s economy 
3.1.1 Strategic location 
The most favorable factor in creating foundations for Vietnam is geography. Vietnam is 
positioned in the center of Southeast Asia. This nation shares the common border with 
China to the north, Laos and Cambodia to the west, and the Gulf of Thailand, Gulf of 
Tonkin, and the Pacific Ocean to the east and south. It is a part of the South East of 
Indochinese peninsula, which is the boundary of the adjacent area between Eurasia and 
Oceania vertically, and the nautical gate for the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean 
horizontally.  
 
Figure 4 - Geographical location of Vietnam 
 
The prime location that left Vietnam under the scrutiny and colonization of other major 
countries in the past has been creating an opportunity for the country’s economic 
reformations after getting its independence. Vietnam is on the crowdedly nautical West-
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East line and Hong Kong – Singapore, enabling the country to be a center of 
internationally marine transportation and to develop the topnotch world ports.  
The bonus to Vietnam’s location is that it shares the common border with China and 
closes to the manufacturing heartland of southern China. It is far less than 1,000 km from 
Hanoi to Guangzhou, Hong Kong and it takes less than four hours from Hanoi to Beijing, 
Shanghai, or Taiwan. The proximity of the most developed regions of China turns 
Vietnam to be an alternative destination, for foreign investors who are looking for a 
place to diversify their portfolio or to reduce the inherent risks, and complexity in 
investing into big countries like China or India. Moreover, it is easily to reach other major 
global supply chains, such as Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Tokyo, Seoul, 
Jakarta, New Delhi, Mumbai from Vietnam. 
3.1.2 Dynamic population structures, large workforce and potential market 
The second factor contributing significantly to the development of Vietnam’s economy 
is the demographic structure. The entire population of this country was recorded at about 
95 million people as the end of the year 2018, of which: the metropolitan population was 
33.83 million persons for 35.7%; the rural community was 60.84 million persons, 
holding 64.3%; and the employed population was around 54 million persons, taking 
57%.7 
Vietnam has been encountering a remarkable transformation in its demographics that 
shows an expansion in the labor force and a reduction in dependency ratio over 30 years 
of 1990-2019. Fertility rate has decreased significantly from a high value of 3.56 to 2.049 
(forecasted) births per woman for the period 1990-2019, showing the same pattern as 
mortality rate. Life expectancy increases over time from 70.55 to 75.37 years. Median 
 




age increases gradually about 5% per year for this period, reaching 30.9 in 2019 (Figure 
5). 
The effect of young population structure into the economic growth of Vietnam for more 
than 30 years of Doi Moi has not been revealed officially yet. However, many studies 
show that the population structure in Vietnam has reached a level significantly impacting 
on all sectors of the economy. Nguyen Thi Minh (2009) concluded her research of 
“Dynamic demographics and economic growth in Vietnam” published in Journal of the 
Asia Pacific Economy that the demographic change contributes around 15% of economic 
growth during the period 2002-2006, which was ahead the time Vietnam being an official 
member of WTO in 2007. 
 
Figure 5 - Median Age of Vietnam and other countries/ regions 
(Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 2019, and worldometers.info) 
As a result of predicting age structures of the population in China, India, and Vietnam by 
2030 (Wei et al., 2019), Vietnam’s demographic composition will be expected to follow 
that of China but still maintain its good health as a whole. Meanwhile, China will no 
longer benefit from the population dividend and suffer from an ageing problem more than 
that of Vietnam. As in this research, for Vietnam, the middle-aged people (aged 15-64) 



















and the elderly are 22.56% and 10.18%, respectively. That means that in the next ten 
years, Vietnam’s population pyramid still enjoys its healthy status in both providing 
efficient laboring resources for the current economy and in ensuring the future workforce 
for the long run. Therefore, the Vietnamese government must manage well this natural 
comparative advantage to promote human capital and technology, transforming the 
economy into the next level before suffering from arising ageing problems. 
The relatively young population and being one of the most massive labor forces in 
Southeast Asia add to Vietnam’s appeal. Moreover, 64% of the total population lives in 
the countryside, giving Vietnam’s average labor cost relatively cheaper than other 
countries, such as China and other ASIAN countries (Figure 6). Workers in the 
manufacturing sectors in Vietnam are paid less than half what is paid for Chinese peers. 
Besides, the availability of rural workers will help ease wage pressures, giving Vietnam 
the time to develop labor-intensive industries, a must for a country of nearly 100 million 
people.  
 
Figure 6 - Manufacturing worker's monthly wage - October 2017  
(Source: Japan External Trade Organization) 
Note: Data in Figure 6 is the base salary as of October 2017 and exchanged to the US 








Vietnam Phillipines India Indonesia Malaysia Thailand China
Manufacturing worker's monthly wage 2017
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3.2 Building-up comparative advantages 
This session concentrates on what differentiates Vietnam’s comparative advantages 
based on what the government sets on its road to open the economy and appeal the private 
and foreign investments. Many countries have the power of young workforces, but not 
all of them implements effective policies. Since Vietnam appreciated the openness to 
international trade and investment after Doi Moi, the government has carried out many 
supportive policies to encourage the FDI inflows. Trade amount has significantly 
increased since Vietnam joined WTO in 2007. In 2018, trade value accounted for nearly 
200% of national GDP, higher than any peering country at the same level of GDP Per 
Capita.  
 
Figure 7 - % Trade of GDP of Vietnam and other countries in the same region 
(Source: World Bank) 
3.2.1 Focusing on long-term economic stability and sustainability 
In Vietnam, the documents for socio-economic development policies differ in the reach 
of the temporal and geographical scope. At the state level, there are three types of 
materials that need to be considered. Among them, the socio‐economic development 
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strategy (SEDS), which is a ten‐year plan, is regarded as a blueprint for Vietnam’s socio-
economic direction. 
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Being exposed from the economic crisis and poverty in the past lays a robust foundation 
for Vietnam’s economic conversion. The Government’s Resolution 11 was released in 
February 2011 to trigger the strategic planning and actions for financial stability by 
stabilizing the macro-economy, boosting production and business, encouraging export, 
curbing the trade deficit, and ensuring social security. Based on that, the 10-year Socio-
Economic Development Plan for the period of 2011-2020 (SEDP, 2011-2020) was 
published in the same year, putting sustainable development at the heart of the economic 
strategy.  
A year later, the 5-year Socio-Economic Development Plan for the period of 2011-2015 
(SEDP, 2011-2015) paid attention to the complete restructure. SEDP, 2011-2015 covered 
restructuring the state business groups and corporations, industries and sectors, financial 
markets with a focus on the system of commercial banks and financial institutions, public 




Following the success of its predecessor, the 5-year Socio-Economic Development Plan 
for the period of 2016-2020 (SEDP, 2016-2020) continues to promote socio-economic 
stability and sustainability as well as stimulates the execution of decisive breakthroughs, 
economic reconstruction coming with growth model innovation and upgrading 
productivity, effectiveness, and competition. SEDP, 2016-2020 also emphasizes the role 
of proactive international integration and boosts the involvement of non-state-run sectors 
with appropriate state financial resources. 
Since then, the economic performance has been blooming with a significant increase in 
the GDP growth rate. The average GDP growth rate is 6.4% for the period 2014-2017, 
reaching its peak of a decade in 2018 at 7.08% and being expected higher in 2019. 
Meanwhile, the inflation rate is maintained at 3.17% in the same period. Moreover, 
Vietnam is going to outpace many regional peers in a number of sectors. Among 
Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam’s GDP growth and GDP per capita have been 
standing on the top out of the others.  
 
Figure 8 - GDP growth rate and Per capita GDP growth rate for Southeast Asian 
Countries - 2018  
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More considerably, the National Assembly and policymakers are directing more attention 
to the long-lasting, sustainable development of the entire economy than the speed of GDP 
growth. Domestic reformations, productivity improvement, environmental targets, 
human resource management, and more are on the way. Based on those supportable 
policies, the outlook of Vietnam’s economy is positive in the long run. It is expected to 
participate in the list of the relatively developed countries in the region shortly regarding 
the size of the economy. For instance, as in the report “the World in 2050: Will the shift 
in global economic power continue” done by PricewaterhouseCoopers UK, Vietnam will 
be the 22nd largest economy on the planet by 2050 based on GDP in purchasing power 
parity (PPP) term.  
3.2.2 Investment for the future - human capital and infrastructure 
It has been more than 30 years since Vietnam opened the door to welcome foreign 
investors. To date, FDI has become a critical sector of the economy, yielding remarkably 
to socio-economic development. The amount of FDI flowing into Vietnam has been 



































































































































FDI DATA OF VIETNAM 1991-2018
Registered FDI Implemented FDI
 
Figure 9 - Data of Vietnam's FDI (1991-2018)  
(Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam) 
In the ASEAN region, Vietnam is one of the largest FDI recipients, attracting $36.4 
billion in registered inflows with 3,147 projects, in which more than $15.5 billion was 
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implemented in 2018 (Source: ASEAN FDI Database) or $19.1 billion following the 
source of the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (the variance of $4.6 million would 
come from the difference in timing of record) (Table 2): 
 
FDI Flows in ASEAN, 2015-2018       
Billions of dollars         
Host 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Singapore 59.7 73.9 75.7 77.6 
Indonesia 16.6 3.9 20.6 22 
Viet Nam 11.8 12.6 14.1 15.5 
Thailand 8.9 2.8 8 13.2 
Philippines 5.6 8.3 10.3 9.8 
Malaysia 10.2 11.3 9.3 8.1 
Myanmar 2.8 3 4 3.6 
Cambodia 1.7 2.3 2.7 3.1 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 1.1 1.1 1.7 1.3 
Brunei Darussalam 0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.5 
ASEAN 118.6 119 146.9 154.7 
Table 2 - FDI Flows in ASEAN for the period of 2015-2018 
(Source: ASEAN FDI Database) 
Investment in infrastructure 
Shorting of capital is one of the disadvantages of Vietnam’s resources. Therefore, FDI is 
the primary channel to bring financial leverage to Vietnam’s economy and to its local 
manufacturing value chains. Understanding that, the Vietnamese government has set a 
variety of policies to attract FDI’s inflows. Improving infrastructure is one of the key 
focuses of the government, covering all sectors: power, transport, telecommunications, 
water and sanitation to encourage more investments from private and FDI players and to 
build the capacity for longer-term growth.  
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The urban network attached with synchronous, contemporary and environment-friendly 
infrastructure, particularly in sizable metropolitan zones has been gradually built, 
following the sustainable development. While many peers in the region also invest in 
infrastructure, Vietnam is doing that more heavily compared to the economic size of the 
country. It is the only country committed to spending more than 5% of GDP on 
infrastructure.8 Vietnam’s share of infrastructure expenditure to GDP is 5.8%, higher 
than any other countries in ASEAN. Transportation infrastructure connecting the North 
and the South of the country and in disadvantaged areas is prioritized. The big 
metropolitan areas, including Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Binh Duong, Da Nang, are on 
their ways to improve transportation networks and facilities. Moreover, highly integrated 
and dedicated economic zones, manufacturing sites and clusters, hi-tech parks and agri-
tech zones are focused on affording the growing pace of FDI inflows. It is recorded that 
326 industrial parks would be established by the end of 2018, in which 250 ones would 



















Out of 141 selected countries (2019) 
Singapore 2.30 % 2.90 % 1st 19th 1st 
Malaysia 1.80 % 5.00 % 35th 30th 27th 
Thailand 1.70 % 4.10 % 71st 73rd 40th 
Indonesia 2.60 % 3.60 % 72nd 65th 50th 
Vietnam 5.80 % 5.80 % 77th 93rd 67th 
Philippines 2.20 % 2.40 % 96th 67th 64th 
 
Table 3 - Infrastructure and Education data of selected ASEAN countries 
(Source: ASEANstats Database, The Global Competitive Report 2019) 
 
8 The Asian Develop Bank, Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs 
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As an emerging market, Vietnam cannot maintain the growth rate without sustainable 
infrastructure. It is projected that to achieve that growth, Vietnam needs to spend average 
$25.5 billion per annum on infrastructure for the upcoming period 2020-2040 if the 
country wants to match the performance of its best performance peers and to continue its 
current trends9. Because of the restriction on the fiscal capacity to self-finance all 
infrastructure requirements on its account, the Vietnamese government has shown its 
openness to welcome FDI and private sectors to large infrastructure projects to meet this 
demand. 
Investment in human capital 
According to the Global Competitive Index 4.0 2019 released by The World Economic 
Forum, Vietnam is ranked at 67th out of 141 countries selected in the report, upgrading 
from 77th position in 2018. However, the human skill indicator is still relatively low, 
placing the 93rd position.  
Understanding that shortcoming of skills of the large labor force, the Vietnamese 
government has been continuously investing intensively in education and human 
healthcare. Vietnam is one of the countries showing a great interest in education, 
maintaining roundly 20% of total budget expenditure of the government in recent years. 
It is also on the top of education expenditure out of GDP among ASEAN member states 
(Table 3, page 18). 
Investments in people are central to the economic and human development, delivering 
considerable premium in the long run. It makes time for the benefits of these investments 
to materialize. At this regard, the World Bank Human Capital Index10 is an appropriate 
 
9 The Global Infrastructure Outlook, Vietnam case (https://outlook.gihub.org/countries/Vietnam) 
10 The Human Capital Index (HCI) database provides data at the country level for each of the components of the 
Human Capital Index as well as for the overall index, disaggregated by gender. The index measures the amount of 
human capital that a child born today can expect to attain by age 18, given the risks of poor health and poor 
education that prevail in the country where she lives. It is designed to highlight how improvements in current 
health and education outcomes shape the productivity of the next generation of workers, assuming that children 
born today experience over the next 18 years the educational opportunities and health risks that children in this 
age range currently face. (Source: World Bank) 
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measurement of long-term human investment, ranking Vietnam as the second place 
among ASEAN countries and relatively comparable to China (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10 - The Human Capital Index 2018, ASEAN and China  
(Source: World Bank) 
When other competitive advantages are gradually depreciated over time, labour 
productivity is expected to become the upcoming focus to upgrade the country’s 
investment and international integration. Even though labour productivity in Vietnam is 
still relatively low compared to other regional peers but has been improved along with 
the innovative process and economic development, reducing the relative distance 
between Vietnam and other ASEAN members gradually.  
The labour productivity measuring at the current price was about $4,521, increasing by 
6% compared to 2017. On average, labour productivity increased by 5.77% annually 
between 2016-2018, higher than that figure of the previous period 2011-2015 (4.35%).11 
Adjusted for the Purchasing Power Parity 2011, the labour productivity growth of 
Vietnam was marked at 4.8% annually between 2011-2018, higher than that number of 
 




















Singapore (1.4%), Malaysia (2% ), Thailand (3.2%), Philippines (4.4%). This 
achievement helps Vietnam reduce the relative gap between itself and other peers. 
However, the absolute distance of labour productivity is still significant and requires 
much effort from the Vietnamese government to catch up with other ASEAN member 
states. Recently, the Resolution 52-NQ/TW, which was activated on 27th September 
2019 about guidelines for participating in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, figures out 
that labour productivity will be managed to increase 7% annually by 2025. 
3.2.3 Strong-built integration networks 
Hanoi and Washington did start to normalize relations under the Bill Clinton 
administrations in 1995 after a 20-year hiatus of severed ties. Then the bilateral 
relationship developed expeditiously under the administrations of Presidents George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama. Vietnam has broadened the economic and political exchanges 
with the US to neutralize the growing influence of China over the country. Since then, 
Vietnam’s economic internationalization has been stimulated dynamically in diversified 
forms, following a comprehensive roadmap towards integrating global rules and 
standards. Vietnam has progressively opened its markets by building bilateral relations 
and participating in multilateral mechanisms in trade, investment, and finance. Joining 
WTO can be seen as a milestone making the country’s first step toward integration.  
 
Figure 11 - Key traders of Vietnam  
(Source: the general statistics office of Vietnam) 
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In 2018, China, South of Korea, the United States of America, the ASEAN, the EU, and 
Japan together held nearly 80% volume of the two-way trade of Vietnam (Figure 11). 
This is the result of its hardworking effort to tighten up the bilateral relationships and 
trade agreements with these countries and regions in years. In terms of integration degree, 
Vietnam has involved deeply in the ASEAN Economic Community and with other Asian 
countries, such as Japan, South of Korea, and China more than other active FTAs. 
However, the country leaders have not stopped looking for new opportunities to get 
Vietnamese products into more potential markets but with higher requirements by looking 
for more opportunities for joining FTAs with other partners in broader geographical 
reach. 
Until the present, Vietnam has become a member of all major international organizations 
and involved in 16 free trade agreements (FTA) in total, including both collective and 
bilateral FTAs. “When all 16 of Vietnam’s Free Trade Agreements12 come in to effect in 
2020, the country will belong to a huge economic network of 59 partners, including 5 
permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, 15 members of the 
G20, and other emerging economies” (Whitebook 11th Edition, 2019, Eurocham 
Vietnam). If Vietnam exploits the “new generation” FTAs with crucial partners, 
including the EVFTA, the CPTPP and the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership) in the upcoming years, there will be more rooms for the economic boom. 
In the face of accelerating international tensions and decreasing economic growth, the 
EU and Vietnam have proven to be robust trade partners13. The EU sustains the strategic 
economic partner with Vietnam as one of the most critical exporting markets. In 2018, 
the EU took account for 17% global export of this nation as well as came to be the fourth-
largest trading partner of Vietnam with the two-way trade up to $56.3 billion. Vietnam’s 
exports to the EU have been growing 11% year-on-year on average, which presents how 
important the EU market is in Vietnam’s economy. The bilateral relationship has been 
strengthened since the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) was officially 
 
12 The complete list of Vietnam’s FTAs is on the annex A 
13 Whitebook 11th Edition, 2019, Eurocham Vietnam 
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signed on 30th September 2019, expecting Vietnam to access more advanced trades with 
the EU. 
Regarding the CTPP, it involves 11 economies: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. The CTPP officially 
entered into force for Vietnam on 14th January 2019, marking the 7 out of 11 countries 
to ratify the agreement (Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, and Peru have remained). Once fully 
exercised, the CPTPP will construct a sizeable Pacific-rim trading bloc incorporating a 
market size of more than half a billion people and accounting for 13.5% of the global 
GDP.14 The CPTPP marks a new step in the internationalization of the country, bringing 
direct and massive privileges to Vietnam from trade integration and upgraded market 
entrance. Above all, it is expected to encourage and enhance domestic reforms in various 
areas. “Even under conservative assumptions, the report estimates that CPTPP would 
increase Vietnam’s GDP by 1.1 percent by 2030. Assuming a modest boost to 
productivity, the estimated increase of GDP would amount to 3.5 percent from CPTPP,” 
according to Ousmane Dione, World Bank Country Director for Vietnam. 
4. How the CPTPP impacts Vietnam’s economy and export activities 
4.1 An overview of the CPTPP agreement 
The CPTPP originally commenced in March 2010, when formal discussions for its 
predecessor - the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) - was launched. The intended members 
had extended from seven to nine to eleven to twelve until 2016. Unexpectedly, at the time 
the deal was at last completed, the U.S President Donald Trump took the United States 
out of the deal in January 2017. Most officers supposed that that action would put an end 
into the TPP. However, the Japanese Prime Minister suggested to revive the deal by 
changing the name to The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
 




Partnership (CPTPP, or TPP11) and adjusting/ resolving/ freezing some of the provisions 
among remaining members.  
On 8th March 2018, the formal signing ceremony was taken place in Chile to sign official 
agreements between 11 members (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam). In spite of a dramatic decrease 
in size since the United States withdrew its signature out of the TPP trade agreement, the 
new CPTPP is still an impactful deal in its own right. At the time of signing, the total 
pooled GDP of 11 member states represented 13.5% of global GDP, which was 
equivalent to $13.5 trillion. CPTPP is the third most significant trade agreement in the 
world at the moment, standing behind the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the European Union with gross GDP of $20 trillion and $19 trillion, 
respectively. 15 The CPTPP is not powerful enough to change the rule of international 
trades as the original TPP’s ambition when standing alone, but still significant for its 
potential. The deal keeps appealing to the United States if this nation still urges to “rewrite 
the rules of the road for trade in the 21st century” as it stated in the former TPP, making 
a possibility of a material reversal in international trade in future. Moreover, many other 
countries, including the United Kingdom, Taiwan, Colombia, Indonesia, South Korea, 
and Thailand have announced interest in CPTPP, which is prospective to stimulate export 
turnovers and strengthen globalization. 
TPP is an “ambitious, high standard” deal. And CPTPP inherits a majority of the 
provisions from the original agreement, preserving TPP’s high level of ambition on trade 
rules and market access when it enters into forces in each member. With 30 chapters in 
total, the CPTPP rule book covers virtually all aspects of trade among 11 members. Out 
of the whole agreement, just some traditional issues are addressed, including the market 
access for goods, rules of origin and origin procedures, trade remedies, sanitary and 
 




phytosanitary measures, customs administration, technical barriers to trade, investment, 
cross-border trade in services, financial services, and legal and institutional aspects. 
Many rooms are designed for advanced trade issues, for example, competition policy, 
intellectual property, labor, environment, government procurement, state-owned 
enterprises, and so on. Under the CPTPP’s tariff elimination roadmap, most tariff lines 
become duty-free when the agreement enters in force for each CPTPP state. Tariffs on 
other goods will gradually decrease over the “phased-out” period, fluctuating by country 

















Australia 1 432 24.99 57,305 0.939 Oceania 7,682,300 25,760 Sydney 




Canada 1 713 37.06 46,211 0.926 America 9,093,510 202,080 Toronto 
Chile 298 18.73 15,923 0.843 America 743,532 6,435 Santiago 
Japan 4 971 126.53 39,287 0.909 Asia 364,560 29,751 Tokyo 
Malaysia 354 31.53 11,239 0.802 Asia 328,550 4,675 
Kuala 
Lumpur 






205 4.89 41,966 0.917 Oceania 263,310 15,134 Wellington 
Peru 222 31.99 6,947 0.750 America 1,280,000 2,414 Lima 
Singapore 364 5.64 64,582 0.932 Asia 724 193 Singapore 
Vietnam 245 95.54 2,564 0.694 Asia 310,070 3,444 Hanoi 
 
 
Table 4 - Brief information of TPP members (2018)  
(Source: World Bank data (GDP, Population, GDP per capita), UNDP (HDI), CIA 
factbook (Coastline length), CEPII’s GeoDist Database (Main city)) 
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As shown on Table 4, 11 states in the CPTPP come from different continents, implying a 
wide distance in geography, language, culture, practice and norms, and more. Moreover, 
there are great gaps in economic and human development levels among members, as well 
as in demographic sizes. These unique characters in a regional trade agreement of the 
CPTPP are expected to help developed countries access more potential markets, and less-
developed countries have a chance to increase economic size, enhance productivity, and 
upgrade living standards. The common thing among 11 CPTPP members is that they share 
in a common area - the Pacific Ocean, which is extremely special. In this area, the Asia 
Pacific, which acts as a dynamic hub of international trade, is the most crowded with trade 
agreements that could be overlapped with each other. All CPTPP members have already 
involved in a broad range of FTAs, consisting of AFTA, ASEAN-Australia-New 
Zealand, ASEAN-Japan, P-4, and NAFTA (Figure 12). Moreover, these 11 CPTPP 
participants are also member economies of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
APEC, not an FTA, is an inter-governmental forum for 21 Pacific Rim member 
economies to develop free trade and investment across the region based on dialogues and 




Figure 12 - "Spaghetti bowl" of TPP, former version of CPTPP  
(Source: ITC MKI ANALYSIS) 
 
 









Australia      
Brunei      
Canada      
Chile      
Japan      
Malaysia      
Mexico      
New Zealand      
Peru      
Singapore      
Vietnam      
Table 5 – Current Regional Trade Agreement of CPTPP members 
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4.2 Why CPTPP could be an answer for US-China trade tension? 
The United States and China have started to end the era of engagement since President 
Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2017. On 14th August 2017, President Trump 
issued a Memorandum to the Trade Representative stating inter alia that: 
 
“China has implemented laws, policies, and practices and has taken actions 
related to intellectual property, innovation, and technology that may encourage 
or require the transfer of American technology and intellectual property to 
enterprises in China or that may otherwise negatively affect American economic 
interests. These laws, policies, practices, and actions may inhibit United States 
exports, deprive United States citizens of fair remuneration for their 
innovations, divert American jobs to workers in China, contribute to our trade 
deficit with China, and otherwise undermine American manufacturing, services, 
and innovation.”16 
 
In 2018, Trump initiated a number of tariffs and other trade barriers on China in order to 
pressure the Chinese government to resolve those “unfair trade practices”, triggering a 
severe trade battle between the world’s two largest economies. After a series of attacking 
and responding in tariffs as well as unsuccessful negotiations between the two countries, 
talks are occurring, but with no unambiguous solution about to happen yet. In company 
with direct impacts on the pace of growth and volume of trade in short and medium terms, 
decisions from any party of the negotiation can reconstruct the global economic structure 
and rewrite the bilateral relationship between the two Pacific powers in the long run. 
While 2018 saw the beginning of the US – China trade tension, it also witnessed a rebirth 
of CPTPP from the dead TPP. Along with reducing conventional trade barriers, for 
instance, tariffs and quotas, CPTPP provides an extensive rule book for modern economic 
 
16 "Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, 
Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974", Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, March 22, 2018 
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cooperation, including competition policy, intellectual property, labor, environment, 
government procurement, state-owned enterprises and so on.  
CPTPP gives another alternative therapy for trade disagreement if not yet a full-fledged 
trade war. In the most favorable scenario in which China joins the CPTPP, this “new 
generation” trade agreement is anticipated to motivate economic reforms toward modern 
and open manners. These reformations, in turn, will ease tensions with the US and other 
countries when the Chinese economy engages itself towards improved standards of 
integration. China has already established an intensive trade volume with CPTPP 
members, then participating in this new generation FTA can decrease or even eliminate 
other trade matters which still existing in these trades. Not only promotes trade networks 
across the Asia-Pacific region, adopting CPTPP’s trade rule but also improves the 
productivity of supply chains and the trading independence with North America. 
In reality, this scenario is not easy to achieve because some of CPTPP members always 
concern about Chinese expansion, competition and dominance in bilateral trades. On the 
other hand, it is still possible to happen when those members are also eager to open the 
more massive trade door into Chinese markets, remarkably with an enormous and market-
orientated economy. Moreover, current economies in CPTPP, such as Japan, Vietnam, 
Canada, and New Zealand are taking advantages of the CPTPP’s provisions and clauses 
to implement comprehensive social-economic reforms that are politically difficult. Those 
achievements could be clear examples for China, which has itself gained significantly 
since its participation in WTO. Therefore, there are enough supportive pieces of evidence 
to believe that CPTPP’s meaningful enforcement clauses would motivate credible reforms 
in case China joins the agreement.17 
In the report of “Answering China’s economic challenge preserving power, enhancing 
prosperity” (Boustany and Friedberg, 2019), the United States is suggested to set up an 
alliance of economies that share the common concern about China’s rapacious policies 
 




and biased trading practices to create the highest pressure for China’s reform. Following 
that, by implementing new FTAs with allies to raise the international trade standards, the 
US can indirectly create incremental economic costs to China from non-participation, 
which in turn stimulates China to reform its economic and trade policies to enter the new 
trade agreement. The CPTPP will be the first in the consideration list because of its size 
and potential.  
A year after the withdrawal from the TPP agreement, the US President Trump showed his 
interest to rejoin the CPTPP in 2018. The main underlying reason is that TPP (now is 
CPTPP) engages critical new rules in the area that makes an enormous difference for the 
US, including competition policy, intellectual property, state procurement, state-owned 
enterprises, and transparency. Combined, the economies in the CPTPP, the EU and the 
United States take into account for 58.6% of global GDP in 2018, as given in Figure 13. 
This collective global segment of the US – the EU – the CPTPP is expected to provide 
enough leverage to create extra costs for Chinese products without China in the trading 
block, hence to force China into a comprehensive reform in policies to integrate into new 
international deals. 
 
Figure 13 - Share of the global GDP, 2018  
(Source: GDP (Current $), World Bank) 
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4.3 The expectation of entering the CPTPP on Vietnam’s economy 
Participating in WTO marked the first milestone of Vietnam’s integration into the 
international playground. Being the seventh member to ratify the CPTPP - the most 
significant “new generation FTA”, it is anticipated to lay the second stone for stronger 
internationalization of Vietnam. Up to now, Vietnam is one of eight countries (Mexico, 
Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Vietnam, and Chile) ratifying the 
agreement on 15th November 2018 and entering in force at the beginning of the following 
year. With the nearly-499-million-people market size, CPTPP is expected to create strong 
economic yields for Vietnam by boosting the country’s investment and export-driven 
growth model.  
Improving market access, expanding market structure 
Increasing export turnover is the direct economic benefit that the government can 
anticipate visibly in its planning. In 2018, earning from exporting to 10 CPTPP’s 
members accounted for 15% total export revenue of Vietnam in 2018. This figure is 
expected to increase dramatically, about 4% annually or $4 billion thanks to the 
elimination of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers, according to an analysis of Minister of 
Planning and Investment, Vietnam. Among the beneficial industries, textiles and 
footwear would be the most favorable from CPTPP’s deals, expected to grow from 8.3% 
to 10.3% annually thanks to the vast variance in tariffs between Most-Favored Nation 
Tariffs (MFN) and CPTPP’s favored rates18. 
Vietnam has built a long-term trading relationship with ASEAN and Northeast Asia 
(Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong) since its first day of 
integration. Being a member of WTO has promoted more the export turnovers into other 
advanced markets, such as the EU, and the US. The bilateral trade between the US and 
Vietnam has increased considerably after signing the US – Vietnam Bilateral Trade 
Agreement in December 2001. Export turnovers to the US overperformed in the 
 




following year, rising 130% compared to the one in 2001. The turnover to the American 
market of the year 2002 doubled its percentage of total exporting actives from 7% in 2001 
to 15%, which has increased afterwards up to 20% - 22% in the following years. In 2018, 
export to the US was recorded $47.5 billion, 20% of total goods outflow and 43.6 times 
higher than that number (which was around $1 billion) in 2001. The United States, the 
EU, China, ASEAN, Japan, the Republic of Korea did together generate 79% export 
revenues of Vietnam in 2018. Due to the currently high concentration of exporting 
markets, seeking for new perspective markets is a critical step to expand the country’s 
export and to diversify the trading risks substantially and sustainably. In CPTPP, whether 
tariff and non-tariff barriers will be eliminated immediately upon the agreement takes 
effect, or following an elimination roadmap, Vietnam still has a chance to access more to 
new promising and large markets in North America (Canada), South America (Mexico, 
Chile, Peru), and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand). 
A solid foundation for additional regional economic integration 
ASEAN not only marked the first step towards international economic integration of 
Vietnam, but it also has taught this country the initial lessons about regional integration 
and development since its participation in 1995. More than 20 years later, Vietnam has 
emphasized the demand for broader integration with all partners, not just ASEAN and 
WTO, by joining “new generation” FTAs, including Eurasian Economic Union – 
Vietnam FTA (2016), CPTPP (2018), EVFTA (2019), and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (upcoming). Standing away other regional trade agreements, 
CPTPP specifically involves countries from various continents, languages, history, 
cultures, and business practices, scales, and development. That brings both challenges 





Restructuring export’s compositions 
One of the inefficiencies in Vietnam economic system is the imbalance between FDI and 
domestic manufacturing sectors with no tight connections. In which, the latter does not 
play as supportive nodes in the former’s supply chains and still lacks technology and 
innovation to catch up with the pace of the former’s growth. As being analyzed in section 
2.2 – Transition in the export structure, Vietnam’s export brackets are going towards 
more advanced products. However, this transition still deploys the labor-intensive 
advantages of Vietnam as well as puts more weight on the traditional sectors, for 
example, textiles and agriculture, as a robust foundation for future development. The 
economists are looking forward that attending CPTPP would restructure import-export 
industries toward more balancing between import and export categories, FDI and 
domestic sectors, and among export brackets to improve the nation’s financial capacity 
and economic independence. CPTPP also creates opportunities for Vietnam’s companies 
to be a part of its collective value chains, promising to contribute more added-value goods 
and services for economic growth. 
Figure 14 - Export's compositions by sectors of Vietnam 




Domestic reforms through making commitments: 
Beyond the direct gains in export activities, long-term benefits from joining CPTPP 
attracts more interest from the policymakers. Up to now, CPTPP is now Vietnam’s largest 
FTA, which aims to create motives and incentives for domestic reforms in all economic 
and political respects. Also, to establish barrier-free entrance for trading in products and 
services between members, the CPTPP brings a rules-based trade environment and an 
improved market access for all market players. Following that, the Vietnam government 
is expected to allow foreign investors to invest with greater confidence by removing 
biased and discriminatory treatments, offering higher level of transparency in information 
and bureaucratic system as well. Delivering commitments under the CPTPP would 
stimulate and accelerate Vietnam’s regulations and reforms of institutions, creating an 
open and transparent business environment, promoting the product quality and attracting 
more FDI inflows towards the country. Not only focused on the elimination of tariff 
barriers, but Vietnam is also currently paying more attention to the strategic positioning 
of the country in global maps.  
5. Gravity model 
5.1 Literature review 
There are three rationales given in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) for what make the gravity 
model successful in the last 30 years: 1) a robust support of formal economic explanation 
already in the 1980s, 2) a consistently empirical interpretation with a high fit to the data 
(high R-squared), 3) a widespread application for analyzing new free trade agreements 
and trade policies.  
This part of the paper works toward estimating how CPTPP can affect Vietnam’s export 
turnover. By examining trade determinants of Vietnam’s export to 10 CPTPP economies, 
the gravity model aims to evaluate the impact of bilateral, regional and global integration 
on Vietnam’s export appropriately. Jan Tinbergen first introduced the gravity model of 
international trade in 1962. In which, it is suggested that the value of bilateral trade inflow 
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and outflow between any two individuals or groups of economies is possibly estimated 
by deploying the “gravity equation”, which is formulated from Newton’s original theory 
of gravitation19. 
A simple form of a gravity equation as below: 





𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 : The value of bilateral trade between nation i and nation j 
𝐺: A simple constant 
𝑀𝑖, 𝑀𝑗: The size of the nation i, j, respectively 
𝐷𝑖𝑗: The distance between nation i and nation j 
The model, then, has been adjusted by log-linearizing both sides of the equation and 
adding some sorts of dummy variables. This modified model is simply estimated by using 
ordinary least square (OLS): 




Where Vx is a set of dummy variables and αi are the respectively estimated coefficients. 
In international trades, gravity approaches are consistent with many different trade 
theories, such as the theory of increasing returns and Heckscher-Ohlin. Therefore, 
findings about the importance of the gravity model do not rule out the relevance of any 
of these theorems in international trade. The gravity model supports to break down the 
elements behind the value of bilateral trade between two individuals or groups of 
economies, defines the main connection between trade determinants and trade flows, and 
clarifies the drawbacks that restrain international trade in current global integration. In 
the gravity model, finding an appropriate aggregation of trade costs is a crucial concern. 
While the other variables are quite clear in definition, it is not straightforward to measure 
 
19 Tinbergen, J., 1962, Shaping the World Economy; Suggestions for an International Economic Policy. Books 
(Jan Tinbergen). Twentieth Century Fund, New York. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16826 
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and infer the height of trade costs and their compositions, which vary considerably across 
countries and regions, and across goods. 
Clarete et al. (2002) used the gravity model in order to assess the main factors behind 
trade flows involving 11 major preferential trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region, 
including data of 83 countries in 1980-2000. The estimated coefficients of fundamental 
variables of the model explain well the international trade flows. As shown in the result 
of their study, the cross-country trade has a positive correlation with income and size of 
the economy. A higher income allows people to have more demanding in more expensive 
and importing goods, then leverages import activities. Hence, GDP per capita is 
employed to assess how the size and income of a country can influence the trade flow. 
Population, geographical areas of both importers and exporters, as well as the distance 
between trading partners hurt bilateral trading activities. 
According to Anderson and Wincoop (2004), as concluded in their “Trade Costs” paper20, 
the cost of trade across borders are on average, about 170% tax-equivalent rate for 
industrialized countries. This 170% figure are broken into 21% transportation costs, 44% 
border-related costs having to deal with paperwork, bureaucracy, tariffs, or different 
cultures and regulatory standards, and 55% retails and wholesale margins for local 
distributors (1.7=1.21*1.44*1.55 – 1). 
In the book: “International economics: theory & policy” (Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz, 
2008), a robust empirical correlation between the economic size of a country and the 
import-export volume is found. Besides, cultural affinity, geography, transport costs, 
distance, barriers, and borders are also the main drivers in deciding the size of a trade. 
Change in value of the domestic currency against foreign currency also leads to volatility 
in import and export activities. Study of Micco et al. (2003) about the effect of the 
 
20 James E. Anderson; Eric van Wincoop, 2004, Trade Costs, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 42, No. 3. 
(Sep., 2004), pp. 691-751 
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European Monetary Unit on bilateral trade for 22 developed countries in 1992-2002 
figures out that the exchange rate is having a consequential impact on the bilateral trade. 
5.2 The bilateral trade determinants 
Reviewing the gravity model in international trade by Jan Tinbergen, Luca De Benedictis 
and Daria Taglioni (2011) sorted the determinants in international bilateral trade into 
three sub-categories: economic attractors, trade distance, and trade policies. Economic 
attractors include the size of export and import countries in terms of USD-converted 
GNP, denoted as Mi, Mj, respectively. Distance consists of ∅𝑖𝑗 and 𝑁𝑖𝑗. In which, ∅𝑖𝑗, 
the geographical gap between two countries in 1,000 nautical miles, plays as “a rough 
measure”21 of transportation costs. Sharing the common border that is supposed to boost 
trade activities between two countries is indicated by the dummy variable, 𝑁𝑖𝑗, taking 1 
if they are adjacent to each other or 0, if otherwise. The political or semi-economic 
determinant, the dummy variable 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is added to augment the model, which is 1 if both 
countries are members of the British Commonwealth Preference system, a sort of 
preferential trade area. A gravitational constant G and a random error 𝜀𝑖𝑗 are also 
enclosed, and all coefficients are determined in an OLS cross-country regression: 
 
5.2.1 Trade flow attractors 
Trade flow attractors are supposed to reflect expenditure capability in the country of 
destination as well as supply power in the country of origin. In line with this description, 
GDP, GNP, population have been used as proxy indicators of attractors. Higher GDP or 
GNP shows a better explanation for the supply capacity in the country of origin and the 
demand capacity of the country of destination. GDP per capita (Frankel et al., 1997, 
Bergstrand 1989) or infrastructure development index (Limao et al., 2001) has been 
 
21 Benedictis and Taglioni, 2011, The gravity model in International Trade, chapter 4 in Luca De Benedictis and 
Luca Salvatici (Ed.), The Trade Impact of European Union Preferencial Policies. Springer. 
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applied as an alternative for the population. To track the income effect, we are going to 
incorporate the GDP per capita of 11 CPTPP economies in our regression.  
Many research papers point out that mutual cross-country settings also deliver a favorable 
impact on bilateral trades. Consequently, along with economic attractors, extended 
versions of the gravity model also take other attractors, including history, cultural, 
institutional, social ones, and so on into consideration. Luca De Benedictis and Daria 
Taglioni (2011) introduced an exhaustive menu of common trade attractors. For example, 
they took language, special history events (of colonial connection, military alliances or 
political entities), religion, nationality (by immigration), institutional and legal system, 
tastes and technology, and a high input-output linkage in the global value chain into 
consideration. 
5.2.2 Trade flow barriers 
All significant issues in international trades are influenced by trade costs, which are hard 
to break out in the full detail and to collect the relevant data. Tariffs and transportation 
costs are definitely a part of trade costs, how about culture distances, negotiation costs, 
country specifics, or product specifics?  
It is quite straightforward to define the transportation cost in theory, but most researchers 
use a proxy parameter in their empirical studies because of the lack of data source. 
Moreover, an appropriate proxy for transportation costs is still under debate. It has been 
not persuasive enough for researchers to use geographical distance as a proxy for 
transportation cost since Tinbergen used it. They would concern that this physical 
variable does not acquire much information. Following that consideration, researchers 
have introduced a large number of proxies: “economic distance” (Anderson 1979), 
“relative distance” (Deardorff 1995), “remoteness index” (McCallum 1995), but still 
under argument. A lot of subsequent studies attempted to give a better option for 
measuring distance, such as Euclidean distance between the two major cities of related 
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countries (capital, the biggest city, major port or airport), or the variance between Free 
on Board (FOB) and Cost, Insurance & Freight (CIF) price in international shipment.  
Being derived from Tinbergen’s suggestion that distance in his gravity model would 
implicate beyond transportation costs, many studies put more attention into the economic 
distance rather than just the physical distance. It means that they are looking for variables 
that hurt bilateral trades and fit the gravity model, for example, a mutually historical 
event of conflict (Martin et al., 2008). John T. McCallum introduced the widely known 
“border puzzle” in 1995.22 He found that inter-province trade in Canada is twenty times 
higher more than cross-country trade with the United States, holding determinants of 
trade (size and distance) constant. This effect is also called as “home bias in trade puzzle”, 
or “border effect”. Following papers of North American, European, and the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) showed relatively less but still 
significant border effect. The gap between relative prices created by formal and informal 
trade barriers, such as tariffs, non-tariffs, insurance fee, freight cost, incompatible law 




Involving a dummy variable of the co-membership of the Commonwealth of British 
Nations in Tinbergen’s work (1962) raised an idea of incorporating trade agreements in 
subsequently extended gravity models to analyze the long-term relationships between 
countries in bilateral trades.  
By deploying trade agreements, dummy variables along with a gravity model, Frankel et 
al. (1997) estimated the supplementation in trade thanks to varied preferential and 
regional trade agreements, for instance, APEC. Wei and Subramanian (2003) adopted a 
modified gravity model suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) incorporating 
 
22 McCallum, (1995), National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns, American Economic 
Review, 85, (3), 615-23 
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country-specific fixed effects in the OLS model in order to analyze the consequence of 
being a WTO member on international trades. The study showed that WTO strongly has 
a positive influence on promoting global trade, but not evenly. First, industrial countries 
that have actively involved in tariffs liberalization enjoy more benefit from participating 
in WTO than developing countries. Second, the joint trade would be more sizable when 
the two partners perform liberalization than that number of when only one side do. Third, 
a negative correlation between protection and trade is unambiguous for both non-WTO 
and WTO members. Interestingly, Hellvin and Nilsson (2000) employed the gravity 
model to figure out the trade relationship in the triangle of the EU, Asia, and NAFTA. 
The average value of international trading activities among OECD economies was 
considered as a benchmark. Accordingly, EU-Asia and NAFTA-Asia trade levels are 
higher; meanwhile, EU-NAFTA trade level is lower than that benchmark. Moreover, the 
link between NAFTA and Asia is more active than the EU-Asia one that could be one of 
the main incentives for the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) establishment.  
Altogether, almost of studies has followed Tinbergen’s original idea to evaluate the effect 
of preferential trade policies on the trade flows between partners. The approach mainly 
engages a dummy variable taking “1” if the preferential trade on bilateral trade flows exits 
or “0” if otherwise in gravity model estimation.  
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Ordinary least squares (OLS)  
This thesis paper modifies an extended gravity model introduced by Peter Egger (2002)23 
and Nguyen and Henry (2016)24 to examine the determinants in bilateral trades between 
Vietnam and other CPTPP countries. The underlying reasons for choosing Egger (2002) 
are more than its theory back and the excellent explanation of trade flows. This modified 
version accounts for “asymmetric circumstances” across CPTPP economies (such as 
significant variance in size, factor endowments, and established preferential trade 
 
23 Egger, 2002, An economic view on the estimation of Gravity Models and the calculation of trade potential  
24 Tien – Viet Nguyen, Michael Henry, 2016, Vietnam’s export to TPP countries – Gravity model, trade 
determinants and trade potentials 
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agreements among members) as well as allows material flexibility for considering other 
variables. Accordingly, the following baseline model is in use: 
ln 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽4 ln 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
In which, 
EXPORTijt  is Vietnam’s export (host country, denoted as i) to other 10 CPTPP 
economies (Australia , Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Myanmar, New Zealand, 
Peru, and Singapore, denoted as j) in year t for 24 years in the period 1995-2018. 
The collective sum-up of GDP (Gijt), the relative country size (Sijt), and difference in 
relative factor endowment (Dijt) are playing as trade flow attractors, and defined as the 
followings with GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and POP (population). Especially, GDP 
Per Capita, which is used in the relative factor endowment’s equation, is a common proxy 
for the ratio of capital and labor (Egger, 2002). 
𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑙𝑛 (1 − (
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
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Distijt stands for the effective distance between the host country (Vietnam) and other 
CPTPP members. Distijt, which follows Head and Mayer (2002)25, is the effective 
distance between countries. It is computed by the physical distance between the most 
major cities of each country, which is weighted by the population distribution26: 
 
25 Head and Mayer (2002), Illusory Border Effects: Distance mismeasurement inflates estimates of home bias in 
trade, CEPII Working Paper No 2002-01. 



















Where k and l are the most important cities of country i and j; POPk, POPi, POPl, POPj 
denote the population of city k, the population of country i, the population of city l, and 
the population of country j, respectively. dlk is the great circle distance (or geodesic 
distance, air flying distance) in kilometers, which involves the geographical longitude 
and latitude in radians of two points on the surface of the Earth. In this paper, the major 
city mentioned in CEPII’s GeoDist Database is considered as the most important location 
of each CPTPP member (as shown on Table 4 - Brief information of TPP members 
(2018), page 25). θ is the sensitive of trade to the effective distance, and usually takes the 
value of either 1 or -1. Head and Mayer also suggested that θ ~ -1 based on reviews of 
other papers. Distijt plays as a proxy for trade costs. The longer the effective distance, the 
higher is the trade cost in terms of transportation, fuel or time.  
Eijt, ASEANFTAijt, and WTOijt  would be added into the model to study the impact of 
policy factors on trade flows. Eijt is the bilateral real exchange rate between the two 
partners in international trade. The bilateral real exchange rate, which is from Elliott and 
Ikemoto (2004)27, is determined by the exchange rate of the currency of the importing 
country (denoted as j) in the exporting country (denoted as i)’s currency, multiplied by 
j’s GDP deflator and divided by i’s GDP deflator. Instead of using the exchange rate of 
the country j’s currency in the country i’s currency, the exchange rate of US Dollar in 
Vietnam Dong is applied in Eijt calculation in this paper. The underlying reason is, in 
reality, most international trading commodities and services are quoted in the US Dollar, 
which would be exchanged from the exporting country’s currency and into the importing 
country’s currency. It is known that depreciation in domestic currency will enhance 
export values of the host country, then a positive sign would be expected from the model.  
 
 
27 Elliott and Ikemoto 2004, AFTA and the Asian Crisis: Help or Hindrance to ASEAN Intra-Regional Trade? 
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The dummy variable ASEANFTAijt is taken into consideration due the role of this 
regional trade bloc in its members. The ASEAN countries have attained considerable 
economic growth and improvement following the outward-looking strategies and 
policies. As mentioned above in session 4.1 – An overview of the CPTPP agreement, the 
FTA “spaghetti bowl” in ASEAN region is rather complex, including both collective and 
mutual trade agreements between ASEAN as a whole or an individual ASEAN member 
with a trading partner. Hence, ASEANFTAijt will cover all the bilateral trade agreement 
between ASEAN member (in which including Vietnam) or between Vietnam and a 
trading partner(s). ASEANFTAijt is equal to value 1 if both countries in a pair are official 
members of ASEAN, or regional FTAs of ASEAN (ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement), or 
bilateral FTAs of Vietnam (Viet Nam - Chile Free Trade Agreement), otherwise it will 
be 0.  
Similarly, WTO co-memberships are denoted by dummy variable WTOijt, which will take 
the value 1 if both nations in a pair officially participate in WTO, otherwise it will be 0. 
Both dummy variables expectedly have a favorable effect on trade flows due to the 
stimulations of adopting the preferential trading terms after joining WTO and ASEAN. 
In order to explain other unobserved variables, an error term ℇijt is included. 
Following Nguyen and Henry (2016), the data will be split into two sub-periods of time: 
1995-2008 (1c) and 2009-2018 (1b) (before and after the financial crisis 2018) to test the 
robustness of the model (1) through the time.  
5.3.2 Fixed Effect adjusted model 
The OLS model (1) is rather good at explaining the bilateral trade flows between Vietnam 
and other CPTPP economies. However, it is still controversial that the log-linearized OLS 
model can result in significant bias (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) or a certain level of 
misspecification (Mátyás, 1997 and Egger, 2002). The OLS model fails to capture the 
combined effect of 3 dimensions of the bilateral trade: exporter, importer, and time 
(Mátyás, 1997) when working with cross-section data. Moreover, OLS’s convenient 
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estimators can lead to inconsistent ones (Egger, 2002) because the demand for some 
goods can be influenced by a specific year and a particular destination. To address those 
OLS-related problems, data panel techniques that capture the country-specific and time-
specific of the data, as well as lower the multicollinearity relating to cross-section data, 
are usually used. 
The massive dominance of the Fixed Effect (FE) in the literature over the Random Effect 
(RE) in data panel techniques is because the RE model requires a high level of restrictive 
assumption of the unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Following that, the country-
specific FE and the time-specific FE are applied to enhance the application of the OLS 
model in this paper. The FE model offers a proper method to determine and explain trade 
determinants in the intuitive gravity model consistently: dummy variables take the 
unobservable multilateral relationship. However, the significant shortcoming of the FE 
method is that any variable collinear with dummy variables should be removed out of the 
model. 
In the country-specific FE model (2), a dummy variable DumCp for each trading partner 
will be deployed. Ten country-specific dummy variables will be included in the country-
specific FE model to avoid the dummy variable traps, which will result in the 
multicollinearity among dummy variables. In this context, there is only one exporter 
(Vietnam), then the dummy variable also presents the CPTPP trading pairs. By including 
a dummy variable for each country, the dummy would measure the unobserved 
characteristics and remove heterogeneity bias; and then the estimates would achieve a 
substantial degree of accuracy. Significantly, the variable ASEANFTAijt which shows a 
perfect correlation with the country-specific FE’s dummy variables, would be excluded: 








Similarly, the time-specific dummy variable DumTp for every year in (24 – 1) years will 
be examined in the time-specific FE model to remove multicollinearity. The cost for 
adding new time-specific FE dummy variables is to drop WTOijt  out of the model because 
WTOijt and time-specific FE dummy variables are perfectly correlated: 
ln 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽4 ln 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 





Our dependent variable is the log of the export from Vietnam to each country of the other 
ten CPTPP economies in a given year for a period 1995-2018, which is obtained from the 
website of the General Statistics Office of Vietnam28. The explanatory variables are taken 
from different sources of data. The nominal GDP, GDP Per Capital, the official exchange 
rate (Vietnam Dong per $), and GDP deflators are acquired from the World Bank’s 
database. The great circle distance comes from CEPII’s GeoDist Database29. The 
ASEAN and WTO co-memberships are acquired from the Nuclear Threat Initiative 
website about ASEAN and the WTO official website, respectively. 
5.5 Result and discussion 
5.5.1 Correlation matrices and multicollinearity 
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix between selected variables, being considered as 
the initial step to examine the intuition of the gravity model. In general, the shown 
correlations are consistent with the general understanding of the relationship between 
variables. As expected, the trade increases along with an increase in the combined 
economic size of trading partners (Gij) and the difference in factor endowment (Dij), and 
a co-membership in WTO (WTO) and a multilateral/ bilateral FTA (ASEANFTA). The 
 
28 The General Statistics Office of Vietnam’s website https://www.gso.gov.vn/Default_en.aspx?tabid=491 
29 CEPII’s GeoDist Database includes a set of different distance and common dummy variables used in gravity 





coefficients of Gij, Dij, ASEANFTA, and WTO, are positive. lnDist gets a negative 
coefficient that is appropriate with its role as trade frictions.  
The correlations between export amount and the relative country size (Sij) and bilateral 
exchange rate (E) is unexpectedly negative. The correlation matrix, which figures out a 
degree of relationship between two variables, just gives the first overview of the data that 
is quite persistent with the theory. However, these correlations are not sufficient enough 
to imply a causal relationship. The further investigation about the relationship between 
lnEXPORTij and Sij , E will be implemented in case any abnormal results are arising from 
the regression model. 
 
Table 6 - Correlation matrix of OLS’s regression model 
The most consideration when working with panel data and gravity model is the multi-
collinearity, in which two or more predictor variables are highly correlated together. Then 
the collinearity problem would reduce the accuracy of the estimates of the regression 
coefficients. The most effective method to detect multi-collinearity is to calculate the 




2 , where 
𝑅
(𝑋𝑗|𝑋−𝑗)
2  is the R2 gotten from the regression model of Xi onto the other predictors. If 
the correlation is present, R2 will be close to 100%, and VIF will be substantial. As a rule 
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of thumb, VIF <10 (Hair et al., 1995), or VIF<5 (Ringle et al., 2015) is acceptable. The 
VIF value for OLS model is presented as in Table 7: 
As observed above, the VIF value ranges from 1.058 to 5.83, and the mean VIF is 3.17, 
which are statistically acceptable. Because the mean VIF is above 1, there is a suspicion 
that a correlation between predictor variables might exist, but not perfectly. 
5.5.2 Testing the fit and time robustness of OLS model 
The result of the OLS regression, as in Table 8 below, shows a high value of adjusted R-
squared: 89.45%, 90.02%, and 96.34% for the entire 1995-2018 period, and two sub-
periods 1995-2008 and 2009-2018, respectively. These high R-squared values 
demonstrate small variances between the observed data and the fitted values, showing a 
significant degree of goodness-of-fit. Generally, it is concluded that OLS models can 
explain well and consistently bilateral trades in reality over time.  
Getting into detail, it seems that the OLS model plays better for the ex-post period of the 
financial crisis in 2008. All models (1), (1a) and (1b) disclose the coefficients of the 
collective sum of both trading partners’ GDP (Gij), relative country size (Sij), and distance 
(Dij) as the expectation with a high degree of robustness. Although model (1) gives a 
coefficient of difference in relative factor endowment variable (Dij) as analyzed, it fails 
to explain the impact of the bilateral real exchange rate (E), ASEAN and Vietnam’s FTA 
(ASEANFTA) and WTO membership (WTO), which are better described by the model 
Table 7 - VIF table of predictor variables 
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(1b). All the effect of explanatory variables will be discussed in details in the fixed-effect 
regression. 
Table 8 - Regression result of OLS model: whole period and 2 sub-periods 
5.5.3 Trade determinants 
After the fitness and robustness of the OLS model are confirmed as in its regression result, 
the fixed effect techniques are deployed to correct the potential bias and heterogeneity 
related to OLS regression. The Table 9 figures out that both fixed-effect models present 
a better of goodness-of-fit than the OLS model with higher explanation power. 
Interestingly, model (2) with the country-specific fixed-effect model comes with the most 
significant level of adjusted R-squared – 92.5% (compared with 89.45% of the OLS 
model – model (1) and 89.87 % of the time-specific fixed-effect model – model (3)). 
However, it associates with a cost of a fewer number of significant variables – just 3 
(compared with 6 in the model (1) and 5 in the model (3)). 
Model (3), which involves the time-specific fixed effect, outperforms the OLS 
model (1) and country-specific fixed-effect model (2). Model (3) shows a better 
explanation of real trade than the model (1) and has more significant variables than the 
model (2). In model (3), there are 5 out 7 determinants that get significant value, 
including the interception, collective GDP of both partners (Gij), relative country size 
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(Sij), the difference in relative factor endowment (Dij), and effective distance (Dij). 
Model (3) also gives an expected sign of the correlation between bilateral trade and all its 
explanatory variables both at a significant and non-significant degree. 
 
Table 9 - Regression result of modified OLS model, country-specific Fixed Effect 
model, and time-specific Fixed Effect model 
Three trade attractors – the collective GDP of both trading partners (Gij), the relative 
country size (Sij), and the difference in relative factor endowment (Dij) – are confirmed 
to have positive impacts on export from Vietnam to other CPTPP economies, as Egger 
(2002), Nguyen and Henry (2016). Accordingly, 1% increase in the collective GDP of 
both trading partners (Gij), the relative country size (Sij), and the difference in relative 
factor endowment (Dij) will boost exporting revenue by 2.901%, 2.391%, and 0.2661%, 
respectively. It means that the higher combined country output, the bigger relative 
country size, and the less similarity in factor endowments between two countries of a 
trading pair will enhance the export activities of Vietnam. 
All three models strongly agree with the negative impact of trade friction factors. The 
longer physical distance between partners creates more cost in time consumption, fuel, 
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bureaucracy, transportation, etc. Thus, longer geographical distance has a higher 
possibility to reduce the bilateral trade. In the model (3), 1% increase in geographical 
distance (Distij) will decrease export turnover by 1.141%. 
Surprisingly, while the model (3) shows the positive impact of the bilateral exchange rate 
and ASEAN/Vietnam – related FTA memberships as expected, model OLS (1) represents 
the opposite (ASEAN/Vietnam – related FTA membership is excluded in the model (2)). 
This finding helps to prove that the time-specific FE model provides a better fit of the 
regression model. However, both are not statistically significant. 
The variable of WTO co-membership gets an unexpected significant impact with a 
negative sign in both the OLS and country-specific FE models (in the time-specific FE 
model, the variable WTOij is excluded because of the perfect multi-collinearity). In 
literature, the effect of being WTO member on the economic development and trade of a 
country is still argumentative. Many WTO regulations, which cover some sectors of the 
economy, such as intellectual property, product transparency, technical and quality 
requirement, and so on, are not bilateral. Therefore, the WTO dummy variable of a pair 
of countries cannot capture all those measures. Since Rose (2004) found no significant 
effect of WTO membership on trade using the gravity model, many papers have re-
assessed the consequence of participating in WTO on bilateral trades. As mentioned in 
Session 5.2.3 - Policies, the study of Wei and Subramanian (2003) shows that WTO does 
promote trade, but unevenly. Industrial countries that have actively involved in tariffs 
liberalization enjoy more benefits from participating in WTO than developing countries. 
Roy and Jayjit (2011) notice that there is no statistical impact of WTO co-membership 
once country-time fixed effects are included in the gravity model. Eicher, Theo, and Henn 
(2011) argue that WTO membership only has a favorable effect on bilateral trade before 
the formation of Regional Trade Areas and between nearby developing countries. The 
unfavorable effect of the WTO’s co-membership on Vietnam’s trade to other CPTPP 
countries has possibly resulted from unreadiness of the economy. WTO accession has 
created both opportunities, advantages, and disadvantages for Vietnam’s economy. Even 
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so, those opportunities could turn into challenges to Vietnam without appropriate macro-
economic strategies, policies, and reforms. 
5.5.4 Trade potential  
Trade potential index 
The trade potential index will be taken into consideration by following De Benedictis 
(2004) and Nguyen and Henry (2016) to implement another in-depth analysis of the 
prospect in trade between Vietnam and other CPTPP members as a whole or between 
Vietnam and each economy in CPTPP. The trade potential index (TPijt), which will be 
from 0 and 1, is the ratio between actual (EXPORTijt) and estimated trade value 
(𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑶𝑹𝑻̂ 𝒊𝒋𝒕). In case the TPijt is lower than 1, it means that actual export value is 
underperformed in the given year, letting more room for trade improvements in the 
future. Standardizing the trade potential index, we will have the Standardized Trade 
Potential (STPijt), which runs from -1 to 1. 





𝑆𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  
𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡  −  1
𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡  +  1
 
If STP or the average STP in the examined period of 1995-2018 is below 0, there is still 
a trade promise for export from Vietnam to other CPTPP states that would be stimulated 
much more under CPTPP implementation. The closer value to -1 implies that there is a 
higher potential in trade between Vietnam and other CPTPP members. Otherwise, closer 
to 1, the trade potential index indicates that bilateral trade is overtraded, and there is no 






Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 
95-18 95-18 95-18 Sub 95-08 Sub 09-18 
Australia 0.231 0.003 0.228 0.434 (0.061) 
Brunei (0.209) (0.001) (0.030) No data (0.030) 
Canada (0.173) 0.003 (0.162) (0.228) (0.069) 
Chile 0.120 (0.006) 0.108 (0.128) 0.321 
Japan 0.039 0.000 0.023 0.085 (0.065) 
Mexico (0.076) 0.004 (0.097) (0.284) 0.127 
Malaysia (0.019) 0.001 (0.073) (0.078) (0.067) 
New Zealand (0.179) (0.000) (0.163) (0.227) (0.081) 
Peru 0.095 0.001 0.127 (0.123) 0.252 
Singapore 0.059 0.003 0.044 0.314 (0.333) 
10 CPTPP (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) (0.007) (0.001) 
Table 10 - Average Standardized Trade Potential (ASTP) 
Figure 15 - Average standardized trade potential 
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In general, three models are reliable in estimating the fitted value of trade amount with 
the adjusted R-squared around and more 90%. Notably, the OLS model (1) and the time-
specific fixed effect model (3) show the outcome of the trade potential index more 
consistently rather than the country-specific fixed model (2) once again. Therefore, the 
vast majority of statistical analysis in trade potential will follow the model (3). 
 
On average, the trade potential index for the export from Vietnam to 10 CPTPP members 
is negative, suggesting that there is still room for Vietnamese products and services to 
grow further in the regional markets even without adopting CPTPP commitments and 
trading rules. Notably, the model shows the negative sign of the index of Brunei, Canada, 
Mexico, Malaysia, New Zealand, suggesting that Vietnam has not fully exploited the 
export potential to those specific markets. Canada and Mexico, which are the two largest 
markets in the American continent in the list of CPTPP economies, promise the abundant 
exporting markets if Vietnam unlocks the prospect for Vietnamese goods there. 
Meanwhile, all three models indicate that Vietnam has overtraded to Australia, Japan, 
Peru, and Singapore, meaning that Vietnam has been setting up an excellent bilateral 
trade with those countries before reaching the CPTPP agreement. 
Breaking the model (3) into two sub-periods of time: before and after the 2008 financial 
market crash, we are focusing more on the latter sub-period of 10-year 2009-2018. 
Vietnam has obtained some significant achievements in the period, such as the GDP 
growth rate of 6.15%, GDP per capita growth rate of 5.07%, the inflow-FDI annual 
growth rate of 9%, and export growth rate of 15% annually. Although the specific export 
turnover from Vietnam to other 10 CPTPP members increases by 8% yearly over the 
2009-2018 period, the trade potential index calculated from the gravity model implies 
that Vietnam has underperformed the bilateral trade in exporting activities with 7 
members except for Chile, Mexico, and Peru in those years.  
This implication withdraws two suggestions. Firstly, Vietnam’s export had been acting 
under its capacity for the current mutual and collective trade agreements between 
Vietnam and its partners until 2018, when the CPTPP agreement has not been activated 
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yet in this economy. The gravity model has not accounted for the new CPTPP trade 
provisions and regulation and the members’ commitments, including tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, transparency, competition policy, intellectual property rights, and so on, but has 
just reflected the up-to-2018 trade policies. Therefore, more strategies should be 
sufficiently implemented by the Vietnamese government to fully take advantage of the 
popular attraction of those CPTPP markets, especially large ones such as Japan, 
Australia, Canada, even in the case of no CPTPP deal. Vietnam should leverage the on-
going regional trade preference to go deeper into the regional integration to improve the 
trade with other ASEAN members (Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore). Secondly, the 
unexhausted trade between Vietnam and the other 7 CPTPP members puts Vietnam into 
more action to take the internal eco-social reforms of the economy to prepare for the 
future benefits from the CPTPP agreement when it is fully implemented. The CPTPP 
agreement, which is called as one of the “new generation” FTA of Vietnam, hopefully, 
brings the massive profit to this 95-million-people country. However, it will turn into a 
big challenge if the human and capital infrastructure, as well as the trade policies, are not 
sufficient enough for CPTPP commitments and provisions.  
6. Conclusion 
The global economy has been unpredictably volatile. The main underlying reasons have 
come from conservative views and decisions of big players. In which, the actions of 
President Donald Trump to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific deal and 
to execute many protectionist policies, the Brexit, the spread of populism in Western 
countries, especially the US-China trade tension have drawn much attention. China is the 
manufacturing hub of the world, but the pace of companies moving production out of 
China is accelerating. Vietnam has been considered as one of the alternative destinations 
for manufacturing factories of many companies, such as Japan’s Nintendo, Chinese 
multinational electronics company TCL, athletic shoe makers – Asics, and so on. 
Vietnam has signed 13 FTA with other partners up to 2019, of which the Viet Nam-EU 
free trade agreement (EVFTA) and the comprehensive and progressive agreement for 
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trans-pacific partnership (CPTPP) are the “new-generation” deals with higher and broader 
commitments. The recent-signed CPTPP aims to become one of new engines of growth 
for this emergingly export-motivated and trade-open economy. The primary purposes of 
this thesis are to assess the trade determinants of Vietnam’s bilateral trades to 10 CPTPP 
economies and to discover the potential in those trades, if any. These goals are 
accomplished by employing the modified gravity model that was introduced by Peter H. 
Egger in 2002 with three econometric methods (the Ordinary Least Squares, the country-
specific Fixed Effect, and the time-specific Fixed Effect) and a panel dataset covering 
exporting amount from Vietnam to the other 10 CPTPP economies over the period 1995-
2018. 
The empirical results of the regression model provide two significant findings. The first 
finding is about how the bilateral trades are influenced, as pictured in Table 8 - Regression 
result of OLS model: whole period and 2 sub-periods. Combined economic size, the 
similarity in economic capacity, and the difference in relative factor endowment between 
two countries in a trading pair do significantly have a positive impact on trades. The 
ASEAN co-membership and bilateral FTA, and bilateral real exchange rate give the same 
effect but not considerably. Physical distance also acts as expected when showing the 
friction effect on trade. However, the impact of WTO co-membership on trades is 
unexpected negative, which is still controversial in the literature. The undesirable effect 
of WTO-membership gives a warning to the Vietnamese government when entering the 
CPTPP agreement. Ineffective trade policies, and inadequate preparations of domestic 
firms and necessary infrastructure along with the fierce competition against other foreign 
players, “made-in-Vietnam” products could be defeated when a majority of trade barriers 
will be removed. 
 
Another finding which is shown in Table 10 suggests that there is still room for Vietnam’s 
export to the CPTPP region as in the calculation result of Average Standardized Trade 
Potential. In particular, Vietnam still has the potential with 7 out of 10 CPTPP economies: 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei. This finding 
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also sheds light on the fact that the current trading policies of Vietnam have not worked 
efficiently as being set. Therefore, the Vietnamese government is supposed to work 
harder to take tremendous opportunities from being a member of CPTPP fully. The “new-
generation” provisions and commitments in CPTPP’s agreement can support Viet Nam 
to create more effective policies to promote an open multilateral trading system as well 
as to boost intensive international integration progress. 
This paper suggests that a modified gravity model adjusted with a time-specific fixed 
effect works well in Vietnam. In addition to the above findings, it is free to further 
improvements for future research. Firstly, the dataset excludes the impact of CPTPP 
status on the bilateral trades of Vietnam because CPTPP ratifications and implementation 
has just been in its early stages. This impact will play a critical element in analyzing the 
trade determinants; however, it requires at least five years for data to be available. 
Secondly, this study is focusing on intra-bloc trades between Vietnam and other CPTPP 
members. The data sample can be extended to the effect from other countries outside the 
bloc, such as the US and China. 
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A. Vietnam’s bilateral export with its 10 CPTPP partner economies in 1995-2018 
 
No Type of FTA Status Date Members 
1 ASEAN Free Trade Area Signed and In Effect 
1998/ 2010/ 
2012 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam 
2 
ASEAN-People's Republic of 
China Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 01 Jul 2005 People's Republic of China, ASEAN 
3 
ASEAN-[Republic of] Korea 
Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement 




Signed and In Effect 01 Dec 2008 Japan, ASEAN 
5 
Japan-Viet Nam Economic 
Partnership Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 01 Oct 2009 Japan, Vietnam 
6 
ASEAN-India Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 01 Jan 2010  India, ASEAN 
7 
ASEAN-Australia and New 
Zealand Free Trade Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 01 Jan 2010 Australia, New Zealand, ASEAN 
8 
Viet Nam-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 14 Mar 2012 Chile, Vietnam 
63 
 
No Type of FTA Status Date Members 
9 
[Republic of] Korea-Viet Nam 
Free Trade Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 20 Dec 2015 Republic of Korea, Vietnam 
10 
Eurasian Economic Union-Viet 
Nam Free Trade Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 05 Oct 2016 
Armenia, Belarus, Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic 
11 
Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership 
Signed and In Effect 30 Dec 2018 
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam 
12 
ASEAN-Hong Kong, China Free 
Trade Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 11 Jun 2019 Hong Kong-China, ASEAN 
13 
Viet Nam-European Union Free 
Trade Agreement 




Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyrus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Vietnam 
14 
Viet Nam-European Free Trade 
















Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam 
16 











B. List of Figures  
 
Figure Name Page 
1 GDP growth rate of Vietnam 1986-2018 4 
2 GDP per Capita of Vietnam 1989-2018 4 
3 Change in the top 3 of Vietnamese export, 2010-2018 7 
4 Geographical location of Vietnam 9 
5 Median Age of Vietnam and other countries/ regions 11 
6 Manufacturing worker's monthly wage - October 2017  12 
7 % Trade of GDP of Vietnam and other countries in the same region 13 
8 GDP growth rate and Per capita GDP growth rate for Southeast Asian 
Countries – 2018 
15 
9 Data of Vietnam's FDI (1991-2018) 16 
10 The Human Capital Index 2018, ASEAN and China 20 
11 Key traders of Vietnam 21 
12 "Spaghetti bowl" of TPP, former version of CPTPP 27 
13 Share of the global GDP, 2018 30 
14 Export's compositions by sectors of Vietnam 33 





C. List of Tables 
 
Table Name Page 
1 Top 10 exporting product categories of Vietnam in 2008 6 
2 FDI Flows in ASEAN for the period of 2015-2018 17 
3 Infrastructure and Education data of selected ASEAN countries 18 
4 Brief information of TPP members (2018) 25 
5 Current Regional Trade Agreement of CPTPP members 27 
6 Correlation matrix of OLS’s regression model 46 
7 VIF table of predictor variables 47 
8 Regression result of OLS model: whole period and 2 sub-periods 48 
9 Regression result of OLS model, country-specific FE model, and 
time-specific FE model 
49 
10 Average Standardized Trade Potential (ASTP) 52 
 
